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The FTC’s unprecedented enforcement action against Intel1 raises 
profound issues concerning the scope of the FTC’s powers to give a construction to 
Section 5 of the FTC Act that goes beyond the substantive reach of the Sherman Act.  
While I have urged the FTC to assert such independence from the Sherman Act,2 this is 
the wrong case to make a break.  Indeed, if anything, Intel poses a risk of seriously 
setting back the development of an independent Section 5 power by provoking a hostile 
appellate court to rebuke the FTC’s effort and cabin the FTC’s powers in future matters 
better suited to an independent Section 5. 
The essential flaw in the Commission’s assertion of an independent 
Section 5 in Intel is that there is little or no connection between the Commission’s 
comparative institutional advantages over Article III courts and this case.  The 
Commission should not make a break for Section 5 independence until it finds a case in 
which it can explain what facts about that particular case—and not about antitrust cases 
in general—justify judicial deference.  Otherwise, the Commission runs the risk that 
courts will interpret its plea for deference as a request to be excused from the rule of law.  
There is a very real risk that courts will view Intel as an effort to achieve carte blanche 
permission for the Commission to run an antitrust program divorced from the strictures of 
                                                 
*  This paper was funded by the Intel Corporation.  The views expressed herein are solely my own and 
not those of Intel Corporation or the University of Michigan. 
1  In re Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341 (FTC). 
2  See generally FTC Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute (hereinafter “FTC 
Workshop”), Remarks of Daniel Crane, (October 17, 2008), Official Transcript at 72-80; available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/transcript.pdf.  See also Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and 
Antitrust, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1159, 1198-1202, 1207-1210 (2008); Daniel A. Crane, Obama’s Antitrust 
Agenda, Regulation (Fall 2009); Daniel A. Crane, linkLine’s Institutional Suspicions, 2009 Cato S. Ct. 
Rev. 111 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2008). 
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the Sherman Act.  Courts are unlikely to react sympathetically to such a perceived 
request. 
This paper’s structure is as follows:  Part I sounds a sympathetic note for 
the Commission’s project of developing an independent Section 5, but also some general 
notes of caution about the enterprise.  It also responds to Commissioner Rosch’s 
arguments for why application of an independent Section 5 is warranted as to Intel.  Part 
II articulates six principles for sound development of an independent Section 5, and 
argues that the Intel action violates each of them.  Finally, Part III suggests a strategy for 
turning Intel into a victory for the Commission’s long-run enforcement powers, even 
while ceding this particular case on its facts. 
I. REASONS FOR CAUTION 
A. The Need for Restraining Principles 
The FTC Act gives the Commission a seemingly simple mandate:  Detect 
and prohibit “unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive [trade] 
practices.”3  The Commission’s powers under Section 5 are at least co-extensive with the 
substantive reach of the Sherman Act—in other words, that anything that is illegal under 
the Sherman Act is also illegal under the FTC Act.4  But the Supreme Court has also held 
that the FTC may go further than the Sherman Act and “stop in their incipiency acts and 
practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts.”5  Thus, “the standard of 
unfairness under the FTC Act . . . encompass[es] not only practices that violate the 
                                                 
3  15 U.S.C. § 45. 
4  FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948). 
5  FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 348 U.S. 316, 322 (1966). 
3
Crane:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
 
 3
Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws . . . but also practices that the Commission 
determines are against public policy for other reasons.”6 
As I have previously argued, there are compelling reasons to allow the 
FTC an independent norm-creation role in antitrust.7  Over the past several decades, the 
courts have sharply constricted antitrust liability norms under the Sherman Act largely 
out of a reaction to the dangers and abuses of private antitrust litigation, which 
outnumbers public antitrust enforcement (at both the FTC and Department of Jusitce) by 
a 10-1 ratio.8  Among these real or perceived dangers and abuses are the chilling effects 
of automatic treble damages and one-way fee-shifting, the damages-compounding effects 
of easy class certification, strategically minded competitor plaintiffs, discovery run amok, 
and generalist judges and unsophisticated juries who create inconsistent and incoherent 
industrial policy.9  Reacting to these perceived infirmities in the institutional structure of 
private antitrust litigation, the federal courts (led by the Supreme Court) have contracted 
the Sherman Act’s substantive liability norms.  While such contraction may be justified 
to mitigate the systemic risks of private litigation, a perhaps unintended side-effect has 
been to stymie public litigation as well to the extent that the government sues under the 
same statute.  
                                                 
6  FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986). 
7  Crane, Technocracy, 86 Tex. L. Rev. at 1207-10. 
8  Id. at 1179. 
9  I have made these points at length in various publications, including Crane, linkLine’s Institutional 
Suspicions, 2009 Cato S. Ct. Rev. 111.  See also Statement of Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner 
Rosch, In re Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelchairstatement.pdf. 
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The Justice Department has no means of avoiding this difficulty—it can 
only enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts.  The FTC, however, need not tie itself to the 
Sherman Act.  Indeed, it has no power to enforce the Sherman Act, but only the FTC and 
Clayton Acts.  If it so chooses, it may declare that it is enforcing the Sherman Act as 
incorporated into the FTC Act through judicial decision, but then it appropriates all of the 
baggage of private litigation as expressed in contracted liability norms.   
In recent years, the Commission has frequently tied itself to the Sherman Act.10  
Why would it choose to accept that baggage?  Of late, the FTC has been shell-shocked by its 
treatment in the courts when it has invoked an independent Section 5.  There is a wide gulf 
between the theoretical availability of an expansive Section 5 and actual judicial affirmation of 
FTC decisions to enjoin behavior that would not violate the Sherman Act.  The courts have 
frequently quashed the FTC’s efforts to develop an independent Section 5, even while paying lip 
service to the independence principle.11  As former Chairman Kovacic remarked during his 
opening comments at the FTC’s October 2008 workshop on the meaning of Section 5, it is 
difficult to find even ten successfully litigated Section 5 antitrust cases over the Commission’s 
nearly hundred-year history.12 
The reason is institutional.  Courts tend to be jealous of their jurisdiction.  To cite 
a venerable precedent to which we will return at end, courts are loathe to abandon their 
                                                 
10  See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (observing that the Commission 
had expressly limited its theory of liability to conduct that would violate Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act). 
11  See generally FTC Workshop, Opening Remarks of Chairman William Kovacic,  Official Transcript at 
4-20. 
12  Id. at 10. 
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 5
prerogative “to say what the law is.”13  In an early decision—subsequently overruled but never 
quite forgotten—the Supreme Court applied a Marbury v. Madison thematic to the FTC:  “The 
words ‘unfair competition’ are not defined by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute.  It 
is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as a matter of law what they 
include.”14  Courts are wary of agency assertions that the agency should be accorded independent 
space to develop legal norms.  As former Chair Pitofsky has explained, a construction of Section 
5 that would make the same behavior lawful at the Department of Justice and unlawful at the FTC 
is “untenable.”15 
So this is where we are today:  Legal doctrine theoretically allows space 
for an independent Section 5 and there are good policy reasons for some movement away 
from the constraints of the Sherman Act, but great care needs to be taken in the 
formulation of a “separation strategy.”  It simply will not due for the FTC to declare 
independence from the Sherman Act and then proceed to formulate its own antitrust 
policy.16  As Commissioner Rosch recognizes in his statement dissenting from the 
Commission’s decision to bring an independent Sherman Act Section 2 “tag-along” 
action, the Commission must not merely assert independence from the Sherman Act, but  
explain the principles that justify departure from Sherman Act norms in each relevant 
case.17  A “just trust us, we’re the FTC,” strategy has no chance of success in the courts.  
                                                 
13  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
14  FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920) 
15  FTC Workshop, Remarks of Robert Pitofsky, Official Transcript at 64. 
16  See Crane, linkLine’s Institutional Suspicions, 2009 Cato S. Ct. Rev. at 132. 
17  Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, In re Intel Corp., Docket 
No. 9341, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelstatement.pdf. 
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B.  A Brief Comment on Commissioner Rosch’s Proposed Principles 
While Commissioner Rosch is to be lauded for attempting to explain the 
particular features of Intel that justify departure from ordinary Sherman Act liability 
rules, I respectfully submit that his four justifications are insufficient.  In particular, 
Commissioner Rosch’s claims are not grounded in the Commission’s comparative 
institutional advantages, but rather in a general hostility to the legal standards enunciatd 
by the courts in Sherman Act cases.  I will comment briefly on each of Commissioner 
Rosch’s justifications. 
First, Commissioner Rosch believes that Intel is an appropriate case in 
which to assert Section 5 independence because the oft-repeated maxim that antitrust law 
protects “competition not competitors” does not fit well in a duopoly market with high 
entry barriers where harm to competitors necessarily results in harm to competition and 
hence consumers.  The premise is correct but the conclusion doesn’t follow.  If Intel truly 
did cripple AMD’s ability to compete in the CPU market and was also able to keep out 
other potential new entrants, then nothing in the Sherman Act’s “competition not 
competitors” maxim would stand in the way of liability.  Conversely, if Intel did not 
cripple AMD through anticompetitive conduct condemned under the Sherman Act, then 
competition itself would not be injured either.  So this is not a very convincing reason to 
argue for Section 5 independence. 
Second, Commissioner Rosch argues that Section 5 would apply if Intel 
reduced the variety of choices facing consumers, even if it did not raise prices because of 
the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.  Certainly, it would be a mistake to 
construe the Sherman Act or any antitrust law to prohibit only anticompetitive conduct 
7
Crane:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
 
 7
resulting in price increases but not conduct resulting in the diminution of quality.  
Fortunately, the courts have not taken that view, but have held that the Sherman Act 
protects against anticompetitive conduct that diminishes quality also.18  So if 
Commissioner Rosch is equating variety with quality (including subjective consumer 
preferences) then existing Sherman Act precedent fully protects the interests he advances.  
But suppose that a particular course of conduct neither increases price nor diminishes 
quality.  In such a case, the market must be functioning well, for a monopolist would take 
its profits either by raising its prices or keeping its prices level and reducing quality.  To 
be sure, some competitive strategies—including certain forms of exclusive dealing 
contracts—may reduce the variety of choices faced by a particular set of customers.  But, 
as recently explained by Kevin Murphy, the Commission’s economic expert in the Whole 
Foods litigation, in such cases the reduction of variety comes with a decrease in price (or, 
more precisely, a decrease in quality-adjusted price) that, on balance, benefits 
consumers.19  So it is very difficult to see how the structure of existing Sherman Act law 
fails to protect consumer’s interests or justifies an independent Section 5 with respect to 
choice and variety considerations. 
Third, Commissioner Rosch argues that courts have been hostile to (my 
words, not his) “monopoly broth” theories where monopolization liability is predicated 
on the “synergistic effects” of multiple varieties of conduct, none of which would be 
independently unlawful but that Section 5 should reach such conduct.  But, if anything, as 
                                                 
18  See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “an 
act is deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms both allocative efficiency 
and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality”). 
19  See Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution, 75 
Antitrust L. J. 433 (2008). 
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I argue in a forthcoming paper, courts have been too indulgent of “monopoly broth” 
theories, allowing liability to be founded on a series of procompetitive acts that 
supposedly combined to harm a rival.20  It is not my purpose here to discuss the proper 
resolution of monopoly broth theories, but merely to observe that (1) many courts have in 
fact recognized monopoly broth theories under the Sherman Act, which negates the 
justification for an independent Section 5 approach, and (2) there is no reason of 
comparative institutional advantage to allow the FTC to aggregate multiple poor theories 
of liability if other plaintiffs cannot. 
Fourth and finally, Commissioner Rosch argues that an independent 
Section 5 challenge is justified because intent should play an important role in the 
adjudication of this case and some courts have been hostile to the use of intent evidence 
in Sherman Act cases because juries tend to be overpersuaded by intent evidence since 
they cannot understand the economic evidence.  Agreed, juries are unduly swayed by 
intent evidence.  But why does the Commission need to rely on intent evidence when it 
has the world’s best economists at its disposal to analyze the objective economic 
significance of Intel’s commercial practices?  As I will explain in greater detail below, 
this is not a case in which the consequences of the challenged conduct—which began 
over a decade ago—are unknown and have to be predicted from the supposed fantasies of 
industry actors.  We have the data; the question is what do they mean? If the Commission 
has to rely on Intel’s supposed intent to make its case, there is something very wrong 
with either the Bureau of Economics (which is stronger than it has ever been) or the 
Commission’s case. 
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Commissioner Rosch’s principles for Section 5 independence come across 
more as quarrels with the interpretation that some judges have given the Sherman Act 
than justifications founded in the institutional structure of the FTC and its comparative 
advantages over Article III courts.  If the FTC is to succeed in revitalizing an independent 
Section 5, it will need to take a more cautious, robust, and ultimately strategically minded 
approach.  Instead of confronting the courts with their supposed errors under the Sherman 
Act, it will need to convince them why the FTC should sometimes—although not 
always—be allowed to walk a different path.  In the following sections, I suggest such an 
approach. 
II. SIX PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND DEPLOYMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT SECTION 5 
This section outlines six principles for development of a strong and viable 
independent Section 5.  Adherence to all six principles is not necessarily essential for a 
successful (meaning both conceptually sound and review-proof) enforcement action, nor 
is adherence to all six principles a guarantee of success.  However, the greater the 
adherence to the principles, the greater the likelihood of success.  The Intel enforcement 
action violates all six principles.  In such a case, there is a very strong likelihood of 
reversal in the courts. 
1. Do not invoke Section 5 in paradigmatic Sherman Act cases 
 
Courts are most likely to defer to administrative agency judgments in 
cases involving commercial practices about which the courts have not developed a deeply 
rooted body of precedent.  In such cases, the courts may allow some administrative 
experimentation and testing, even though they might not have reached the same result as 
the agency if they had analogized to conduct already covered by established liability 
norms.  Conversely, courts are least likely to defer when they have already spoken to the 
10




exact practice on many occasions and developed a time-tested body of liability rules to 
govern it.  Refusal by the agency to honor the judicially created precedents may look—to 
judges at least—like intransigence.21  It is human nature (and judges are human after all) 
to be more open to an idea on which one has not yet expressed an opinion than to approve 
of an idea that contradicts one’s prior assertion. 
An example of such judicial hostility to an agency decision recently 
appeared in Schering-Plough, where the Eleventh Circuit testily rebuked the Commission 
for failing to follow its Valley Drug decision on patent settlements.22  The court took 
umbrage at the Commission’s failure to adhere to Valley Drug’s legal framework in a 
private Sherman Act case when deciding a very similar issue in an adjudicative 
proceeding.  The Commission should avoid similar judicial confrontation by declining to 
assert Section 5 independence in cases where the courts have recently decided precisely 
the same questions under the Sherman Act and decided, as a policy matter, to confine the 
liability rule in a particular way. 
The bulk of the Intel enforcement action is a challenge to commercial 
practices about which there is paradigmatic Sherman Act precedent.  Much of the case 
challenges Intel’s pricing/rebating behavior. The Complaint acknowledges that that these 
practices are akin to predatory pricing, but then proposes tests that are at odds with well-
established Sherman Act precedents.  For example, the Complaint includes sunk costs in 
the appropriate measure of cost and says that the Commission need not prove the 
                                                 
21  See FTC Workshop, Remarks of Robert Pitofsky, Official Transcript at 65 (“The Federal Trade 
Commission really cannot overrule the Supreme Court.  I don’t care what Section 5 says.”). 
22  Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). 
11
Crane:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
 
 11
possibility of recoupment23—both of which assertions are directly at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s insistence that predatory pricing plaintiffs show pricing below an 
appropriate measure of incremental cost and the dangerous probability of recoupment.24 
The Complaint also makes assertions about Intel’s alleged exclusive 
dealing or exclusive dealing like contracts.25  Like predatory pricing, exclusive dealing is 
subject to well-established judicial liability norms.26  The last major Justice Department 
monopolization case was an exclusive dealing matter.27  Whether or not the Commission 
can satisfy those norms as to Intel, exclusive dealing claims are very familiar to the 
courts. 
The Complaint also asserts that Intel had a “duty to deal” with its 
competitors.28  Such an allegation waves a red flag in the face of the courts, which have 
been sharply cutting back on the duty to deal since Aspen Skiing29 narrowly opened the 
                                                 
23  Complaint ¶ 53. 
24  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).  In Brooke Group, 
the Supreme Court held that recoupment (either actual or dangerously probable) is required in every 
predatory pricing case, whether brought under the Sherman Act or the Robinson Patman Act.  Id. at 
224.  It also held that defendant’s price must be shown to have fallen below “an appropriate measure of 
cost.”  Id. at 222-23.  While the Court found it unnecessary to decide on exactly what measure of cost 
should be employed, it suggested that cost in a predation context means “incremental cost.”  Id. at 223.  
Post-Brooke Group courts have held that Brooke Group rules out any effort to define cost in a way that 
does not approximate incremental cost.  See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 
909 (9th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2003). 
25   Complaint ¶¶ 51-52.  
26  The leading Supreme Court decision, expounded upon hundreds of times in subsequent lower court 
decisions, is Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
27  U.S. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). 
28  Complaint ¶ 21. 
29  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
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door to the duty.  In Trinko,30 the Supreme Court declared Aspen “at or near the outer 
boundary of § 2 liability” and, in its most recent Section 2 decision—linkLine31—
continued to cast aspersions on any duty to deal.  It would be very surprising to see the 
courts passively defer to an independent Section 5 evaluation of refusal to deal claims 
when they have spent so much time and energy analyzing such claims in recent years. 
It is not my purpose here to refute the Intel complaint as though it were a 
Sherman Act case, an enterprise I will take up in a subsequent paper.  Rather, it is to 
observe that this is a paradigmatic Sherman Act case.  For virtually every practice alleged 
in the Complaint, there is a well-developed body of Sherman Act precedent that will 
naturally become the focus of legal argumentation on appeal.  Convincing a reviewing 
court to defer to the Commission’s prophylactic interpretation of Section 5 where courts 
already have honed legal tests for the relevant conduct will be a very tough sale. 
2.  Do invoke Section 5 in cases involving a statutory gap 
 
One area where many commentators have urged the Commission to assert 
Section 5 independence is where there is a gap between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act.32  Although Sections 1 and 2 plausibly could be read to cover all commercial 
conduct of an anticompetitive nature seamlessly, judicial construction of the statutory 
texts has created some coverage gaps.  Section 1 requires a “contract, combination, or 
conspiracy”—and hence agreement between at least two unrelated actors—which 
precludes coverage of purely unilateral acts, such as the unilateral adoption of practices 
                                                 
30  Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) 
31   Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Communcs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009). 
32  See, e.g., FTC Workshop, Comments of Robert Pitofsky, Official Transcript at 65. 
13
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that facilitate tacit price coordination, or unsuccessful attempts to induce others to join a 
cartel.  Section 2 requires monopoly power, thus precluding application to 
anticompetitive acts involving a lesser degree of market power.  Further, there is a serious 
juridical question about the viability under Section 2 of “joint monopolization” offenses 
where the defendants did not agree on a concerted pattern of conduct but adopted parallel 
measures, such as exclusive dealing contracts, that effectively lock up the market to new 
entrants. 
During the 1970s, the FTC brought cases that sought to fill these statutory 
gaps with the seamless and open-ended text of Section 5.33  Though it was rebuffed by 
the courts, the Commission is surely on strong ground when asserting Section 5 as a 
catch-all, intended by Congress to avoid end-runs around the Sherman Act.  The FTC 
Act’s legislative history evidences such a Congressional intent.34  Further, it is not hard to 
explain to courts why the Act should be read broadly to capture conduct that, for statutory 
construction as opposed to public policy reasons, falls outside the purview of the 
Sherman Act. 
The Intel case involves no such statutory gaps, as evidenced by the 
Commission’s decision (strongly objected to by Commissioner Rosch) to bring a 
supplemental Sherman Act Section 2 challenge concerning the same conduct as the 
Commission challenges in its Section 5 allegations.  As set forth in the previous section, 
the conduct challenged here is paradigmatic Sherman Act conduct.  It will be difficult for 
                                                 
33  See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting FTC’s efforts to 
challenge unilaterally adopted basing point pricing systems). 
34  See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC:  Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 
71 Antitrust L. J. 1, 74-75 (2003). 
14




the Commission to explain the need for Sherman Act independence in a case involving 
conduct that the Commission admits is directly covered (and unfavorably to the 
Commission’s position) by the Sherman Act. 
3.  Do invoke Section 5 in cases involving fraud or deception 
 
The FTC’s original mission, incorporated in the 1914 Act creating the 
Commission, was to prohibit “unfair competition.”  In the 1938 Wheeler-Lea 
Amendment, Congress added a prohibition on “unfair or deceptive” trade practices.  
Although these prohibitions are juridically separate and not every “unfair method of 
competition” need involve “deception,” there are obvious statutory synergies between the 
amended statute’s competition and deception prongs. It follows that the Commission 
should enjoy the greatest independence from the constraints of Sherman Act law when 
advocating against market power acquired by deception or in antitrust cases that 
otherwise involve misrepresentation or fraud.35 
Consider Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in FTC v. California Dental, 
where he and three other justices assumed that the Commission should be afforded an 
extra measure of discretion when dealing with a dentist’s organization’s prohibition on 
price and quality advertising that was ostensibly justified by the prevention of fraud.36  
All four Justices who signed onto Justice Breyer’s opinion are still on the Court and 
Justice Souter, who wrote the majority opinion, has been replaced by Justice Sotomayor.  
                                                 
35  See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226 (1968) (observing that FTC determinations are 
entitled to “great weight” when the FTC has previously studied and examined a particular issue on 
multiple occasions). 
36  California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 787 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (observing that the FTC “an expert in the area of false and misleading advertising,” 
found no basis for the association’s claim that a prohibition on price and quality advertising was 
necessary to protect consumers against misleading claims). 
15
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The best test case in the Supreme Court for an independent Section 5 would be one where 
the Commission could argue for a norm-creation role in areas involving deception or 
fraud, justified by its unique statutory mandate and expertise with such matters. 
Although there are a few scattered references to deception in the Intel 
Complaint, deception clearly is not the core of the action.  As to the CPU market, the 
Complaint enumerates five species of alleged anticompetitive conduct:  first, 
anticompetitive contracts with OEMs (¶ 6); second, market share or volume discounts to 
OEMs (¶ 7); third, the redesign of its products in markets adjacent to CPUs (¶ 8); fourth, 
paying suppliers of complementary software and hardware products to eliminate or limit 
support for non-Intel CPUs (¶ 9); and only fifth and last, deception by failure to disclose 
information about the effects of its redesigned compiler on non-Intel CPUs (¶ 10).  
Similarly, the Complaint enumerates a catalogue of alleged wrongs as to the GPU 
market, of which deception is merely one.  (¶ 18) 
Not only are the references to deception few and thin, they appear to 
bootstrap the other antitrust allegations.  For instance, the Complaint alleges that Intel 
denied interoperability between competitive GPUs and Intel’s CPUs and then deceived 
people (who, exactly, is unspecified) about interoperability.  (¶ 18)  Similarly, it alleges 
that Intel anticompetitively redesigned its compilers and then failed to disclose its 
anticompetitive redesigns.  (Compare ¶¶ 8, 10)  This is much like charging a corporate 
director with breach of fiduciary duty for failing to consider a promising tender offer and 
then fraud for failing to report himself.  The fraud charge has little, if any, extra value. 
In context, the deception allegations look suspiciously like an attempt to 
justify an independent Section 5 challenge in a case that in reality has very little to do 
16




with fraud or deception.  The Commission would be on much stronger ground in bringing 
a Section 5 challenge in a circumstance where fraud or misrepresentation lay at the heart 
of the case. 
4.  Do invoke Section 5 in cases involving direct relations between the defendant and 
consumers 
The FTC brands itself as first and foremost a consumer protection 
agency.37  The Commission enjoys its greatest prestige in that capacity, as manifested by 
the extreme popularity and positive reputational benefits for the Commission of the Do 
Not Call registry.  Indeed, the courts have afforded the Commission Chevron deference 
almost exclusively in its consumer protection capacity.38  It follows that the Commission 
is most likely to secure deference from the courts for an independent Section 5 
construction when the Commission is acting directly for the benefit of consumers. 
To secure maximum deference, the Commission should not only invoke a 
general consumer welfare justification for its actions—all antitrust actions should be 
justified on consumer grounds, whether or not consumers are directly involved in the 
market segment at issue.  Rather, the Commission should pursue an independent Section 
5 program primarily in cases that directly involve choices and decisions by consumers 
and where the Commission can explain how its expertise with consumer psychology, 
                                                 
37  See, e.g., Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on “Proposed Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency:  Implications for Consumers and the Federal Trade Commission;” Before the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection, United States House of Representatives (July 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/090708Acfpatestimony.pdf (noting that the “Commission also 
appreciates the proposal’s recognition of the FTC’s role as the nation’s consumer protection agency.”). 
38  See Crane, Technocracy, 86 Tex. L. Rev. at 1206-07. 
17
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values, and practices justifies a more liberal construction of Section 5 than might be 
justified under the Sherman Act. 
For example, a good bit of the Justice Department’s enforcement action 
against Microsoft involved claims about consumer behavior.  Operating system users 
allegedly were confused by the existence of multiple browsers on a desktop, which meant 
that if Microsoft indelibly engraved Internet Explorer on the Windows desktop, OEMs 
would be reluctant to add Netscape Navigator for fear that their support lines would be 
overwhelmed by confused and irate consumers.39  Thus, even in a case involving 
primarily commercial practices between businesses (operating systems, browsers, 
programmers, OEMS, etc.), consumer mentality, habits, and vulnerabilities played a 
major role.  In a case like Microsoft, the Commission could stake a strong claim to 
Section 5 independence by invoking its expertise about, and protection of, consumers. 
The Intel case, by contrast, seems to have little to do with consumer 
decision-making.  Again, most of the allegations concern contractual relations between 
Intel and OEMs that supposedly constrained AMD, Nvidia, and Via in their respective 
markets.  The Intel matter is primarily a dispute about relations between big businesses, 
not one where consumer psychology or habits should play a major role.  Accordingly, 
there is very little in the FTC’s unique expertise that should justify departure from 
ordinary Sherman Act norms in Intel.   
5.  Do invoke Section 5 in cases involving incipient behavior 
Agency expertise may be most useful—and hence call for the greatest 
judicial deference—where it concerns predictions about future consequences of incipient 
                                                 
39  U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61 (2001). 
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behavior.  In such cases, courts may be comparatively ill-equipped to divine the future 
and more likely to trust an agency’s prediction based on its superior familiarity with the 
type of conduct at issue.  Conversely, courts are less likely to defer when the relevant 
conduct has been in place for some time and its actual effects can be tested using judicial 
empirics—discovery and adversarial procedures.  Judges are more confident in answering 
the question “have prices gone up” or “has innovation been stifled” than “are prices likely 
to go up” or “is innovation likely to be stifled.” The more confident judges are in their 
own abilities to work out the facts, the less likely they are to defer to administrative 
agencies. 
The Intel Complaint alleges that Intel’s anticompetitive practices began in 
1999.  (¶ 2)  This is obviously not a case of incipient conduct.  The Korean, Japanese, and 
European authorities have already concluded their investigations, aspects of the case went  
to the U.S. Supreme Court six years ago,40 and Intel has already settled with AMD after 
years of protracted litigation.  No predictions need be made about the effects of Intel’s 
conduct on the market, about the viability of AMD or other competitors, about price 
levels, or about the pace and quality of innovation.  While the conclusions about those 
facts are contested, the data supporting the conclusions have been revealed in the market 
for over a decade and collected and sifted by scores of lawyers, economists, and 
regulators.  FTC expertise is not needed to turn up new angles on the data or make bold 
predictions about what will happen in a year or two if Intel’s behavior is left unchecked. 
It is hard to see the need for an independent Section 5 in such a case.  
Indeed, Supreme Court precedent appears to preclude it.  Consider the classic formulation 
                                                 
40  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). 
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of an expansive Section 5 power, cited in the first paragraph of the Intel Complaint:  The 
FTC Act “was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act . 
. . to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate 
those Acts . . . as well as to condemn as ‘unfair methods of competition’ existing 
violations of them.”41  As this quotation makes clear, the FTC’s prophylactic Section 5 
powers—the power to reach beyond the Sherman Act—exist as to categories of incipient 
behavior that could “when full blown” blossom into Sherman or Clayton Act violations.  
Conversely, as to practices that are not incipient but fully developed, Brown Shoe 
suggests that the FTC Act is merely co-extensive with the Sherman Act. 
6.  Do not invoke Section 5 in cases seeking extraordinary remedies 
One of the chief justifications for giving the FTC prophylactic powers 
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act is that Section 5 remedies are prospective and 
preventative rather than compensatory, punitive, or structural.42   The Commission should 
be accorded the greatest deference on liability norms when it simply orders the defendant 
to cease and desist from conduct that could impair the competitive functioning of a 
market in the future.  When the Commission seeks extraordinary remedies—such as 
those that radically restructure an allegedly damaged market and seek to restore 
competition—the likelihood of judicial deference on liability norms is much smaller.  
                                                 
41  FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) (quoting FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 
U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953)). 
42  See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226 (1968) (observing that the FTC Act was intended to 
delegate power to “’an administrative body of practical men’ who will be able to apply the rule enacted 
by Congress to particular business situations, so as to eradicate evils with the least risk of interfering 
with legitimate business operations”) (citation omitted). 
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The Sherman Act’s criminal penalties and treble damages require a strict 
construction of the Act, whereas the semi-regulatory nature of the FTC Act creates 
greater room for a broad enforcement mandate.  As explained in the first treatise on the 
FTC, written the year after the Commission’s formation (by the son of the first Justice 
Harlan and the father of the second Justice Harlan): 
The word “unfair” is undeniably indefinite in sense and meaning.  What 
one person may consider “unfair” in competitive trade, another may 
perhaps regard as legitimate.  Conceivably, members of a court may 
disagree as to whether or not, under the circumstances of a particular case, 
a given method of competition is “unfair,” just as in one case they were 
unable to agree and adjudge whether or not certain regulations there 
involved constituted an “unreasonable” restraint of trade within the 
purview of the Sherman Law.  That, however, is of no consequence, so far 
as concerns the validity of the Trade Law [the FTC Act].  The Trade Law 
does not purpose to denounce any competitive act as a crime.  It does not 
provide for the imposition of a fine upon, or for the imprisonment of, any 
person guilty of practising “unfair methods of competition.”  Whatsoever 
the peril, under the Sherman Law, of practising “unfair methods of 
competition,” a person resorting to such practices incurs no other risk, 
under the Trade Law, than that the Trade Commission, by proceeding as 
pointed out in the statute, may obtain the order of a court requiring him to 
cease and desist from such practice.43 
 
At least that is true where the FTC seeks truly prospective, corrective, and 
non-punitive remedies akin to cease and desist orders.  For example, in nData, the 
Commission invoked Section 5 to require an intellectual property licensor to comply with 
its preexisting commitment to license on particular terms.44  There was nothing punitive 
or deterrence-oriented about that remedy.  It was thus consistent with the FTC’s broad 
prophylactic powers to declare conduct unlawful combined with narrower remedial 
possibilities than the other antitrust laws.  Even if the Sherman Act might not have 
                                                 
43  JOHN MAYNARD HARLAN & LEWIS WILSON MCCANDLESS, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ITS 
NATURE AND POWERS:  AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TRADE LAW AND RELATED STATUTES 31 (1916). 
44  In re Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, 2008 WL 258308 (F.T.C.). 
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allowed a finding of liability, the Commission may have had the power under Section 5 
to correct a market failure based on industry participants’ reasonable reliance on nData’s 
prior representations about its licensing intentions. 
In Intel, by contrast, the relief sought by Complaint Counsel is 
extraordinarily broad and invasive to the point of appearing punitive.  It effectively strips 
Intel of control over its pricing and distribution strategies, technological development, 
intellectual property enforcement activities, advertising and information dissemination, 
and customer relations for the foreseeable future and places Intel’s core business 
functions into the receivership of an independent monitor controlled by the Commission.  
The relief requested, if granted by the Commission, would shackle Intel’s ability to 
compete effectively, significantly damage Intel’s business, and fundamentally alter the 
shape of the relevant markets.  That the proposed relief is styled as prospective and 
corrective cannot detract from the obvious fact that it would be a far greater punishment 
to Intel than the imposition of even a substantial fine or damages award. 
Although liability and remedy are theoretically separate and independent 
analytical modes, there is little doubt that reviewing courts will take into account the 
stringency of the Commission’s proposed remedy in deciding how much leeway to 
accord the Commission under Section 5.  The Commission could not have picked a case 
with a more aggressive set of proposed remedies to advance its case for an independent 
Section 5.  In my view, this is a colossal mistake.   
III. A MARBURY V. MADISON  STRATEGY FOR THE INTEL CASE 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the Intel action raises serious risks of 
setting back the FTC’s antitrust enforcement powers.  Certainly, the Commission risks 
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losing the matter in a pro-business appellate court45 or the Supreme Court during a time 
of economic trouble when antitrust cases are historically difficult for the Government to 
win.46  But the risk goes far beyond losing this individual matter.  There is a very real risk 
that an appellate court will write an opinion rebuking the Commission for asserting 
independence from the Sherman Act, thus setting a precedent that could constrain the 
Commission’s enforcement mission for years to come. 
Nonetheless, there is a way forward that could turn Intel into a victory for 
the Commission’s enforcement power.  It is what I will call a Marbury v. Madison47 
strategy.  Should the Commission conclude that Intel’s conduct did not violate Section 5, 
it could nonetheless create a precedent for more expansive enforcement powers in the 
future. Indeed, such an opinion could work to the Commission’s long-run advantage, 
since it would be insulated from immediate and potentially hostile appellate review—just 
as Marbury created a long-run victory for judicial power even while deciding against 
judicial power on the narrow facts of that case.  
To provide a very abbreviated recap on Marbury, early during the 
Jeffersonian period, Chief Justice Marshall faced a dilemma:  Although he wanted to 
affirm in principle the power of judicial review of acts of Congress, he risked seriously 
damaging the Court’s long-run effectiveness and prestige by striking down an act only to 
                                                 
45  Under the FTC Act, a losing defendant may appeal to any of the federal appellate courts “within any 
circuit where the method of competition or act or practice in question was used or where such person, 
partnership, or corporation resides or carries on business.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(c).  This means that Intel 
can pick any of the federal circuits in which to lodge its appeal.   
46  See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Enforcement During National Crises:  An Unhappy History, Global 
Competition Policy (Dec. 2008). 
47  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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have the newly elected Jeffersonians, who were hostile to the Federalist Supreme Court, 
disregard the Court’s decision.48  Hence, Marshall wrote an opinion that at once declared 
Madison’s refusal to deliver Marbury’s commission illegal, but also the Judiciary Act 
unconstitutional insofar as it assigned a mandamus power, a species of original 
jurisdiction, to the Supreme Court.  The upshot was that the Court declined to issue the 
writ of mandamus sought by the Federalists, even while affirming the power of the Court 
to strike down an Act of Congress.  Though hostile to the Court’s assertion of the power 
of judicial review, the Jeffersonians were impotent to challenge the decision since it left 
the status quo undisturbed and denied the Federalist justices of the peace their 
commissions.  In the long run, establishing the principle of judicial review proved far 
more lasting a victory for the Federalist view of judicial power than winning the narrow 
skirmish over justice of the peace commissions. 
The FTC could pursue a similar strategy here by writing an opinion 
announcing a broad view of its Section 5 powers and independence from the Sherman 
Act, even while finding in favor of Intel and thus avoiding an immediate and probably 
hostile judicial reaction.  Such an opinion would demonstrate the FTC’s self-control over 
its enforcement powers and assuage concerns that divorcing Section 5 from the Sherman 
Act would lead to unchecked administrative discretion and an abandonment of the “rule 
of law.”  The opinion could announce a framework for future judicial review of Section 5 
decisions—perhaps announcing a set of limiting principles for independent Section 5 
challenges along the lines of those proposed above.  In the future, courts might be much 
more inclined to respect the Commission’s views on Section 5 if it had previously 
                                                 
48  See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison:  Making Defeat Look Like 
Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES (Michael Dorf, ed., 2d ed., 2009). 
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articulated a self-disciplining set of limitation principles and censured itself without the 
need for judicial intervention. 
In the long run, such an opinion might do a great deal more to revive the 
Commission’s enforcement powers than an effort to survive judicial review after an 
adverse finding against Intel.  Even if the FTC is convinced that it might win this case in 
the courts, there are undoubtedly very substantial risks of reversal and set-back.  It would 
be far better to proceed with Section 5 independence cautiously and incrementally in 
niche cases than in a high-profile, headline-grabbing case where reversal could seriously 
damage the Commission’s enforcement agenda for years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
In the legal, academic, political, and business communities, there is a high 
degree of skepticism about any effort by the Commission to assert independence for 
Section 5 from the Sherman Act.  On many occasions, the Commission has felt the sting 
of a similar sentiment in the courts.  It may be that the time has come for the Commission 
to launch a renewed effort for Section 5 independence.  Such a move, however, requires 
not only the right time, but also the right case.  Intel is not that case. 
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